PROBLEMS OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION AND POTENTIALS FOR CONFLICT IN THE LIANGSHAN YI AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE
The problems of autonomy in Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture are not fundamentally different from those in other regions. It should be emphasized again here that the central problem of autonomy does not lie in legal regulation, that is, in the lack of legal ordinances. Liangshan Prefecture, like other autonomous regions, enacts many local legal regulations. The weakness is rather that (a) there lacks a mechanism for implementation, and (b) the Party'sauthority is prior and superior to autonomy in every case.
[1] The “Autonomy Regulation of the Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture” of 1987 confirms explicitly the Party's leading role. See Liangshan Yizu Zizhizhou (1991, 39).
In particular, the establishment of autonomy in the prefecture is oriented to the national autonomy law, with the corresponding restrictions. Even according to this law, decisions and policies of superior state organs do not need to be carried out when they do not correspond to the conditions of the locality. In any case it gives the local authorities the right to make a proposal and have it decided upon by the corresponding higher organs (usually the provincial authorities). The decision thereby remains with those who had the original power to decide. If they stand with their original decision, then their determination is decisive and must in every case be carried out according to “democratic centralism” (Liangshan Yizu Zizhizhou 1991, 39).In the following paragraphs, I will use a few examples to problematize the rights of self-administration and the potential for conflict in Liangshan Prefecture. This is not intended to provide a comprehensive and systematic overview of autonomy, but rather to provide a selection that, on the one hand, deals with basic problems that have not yet been publicly problematized, such as ethnic names and the drawing of territorial boundaries, and on the other
The Question of Names
In the 1950s, Beijing arbitrarily created nationalities and—in some cases—nationalities names. The criteria for these were set by the Party leadership. Stevan Harrell spoke in this context of atriple pattern of ethnic classification: ethnohistory, a scholarly discourse of the history of a nationality or an area; state discourse of ethnic classification, the official classification by Chinese authorities; and ethnic identity,the perception of one's own and others' ethnic identity (Harrell 1996b, 98). The official name Yi represents the state discourse of ethnic classification. In this respect it is necessary to problematize this official name: in the first place, the fact of putting together different groups, some of whom do not see themselves as partof the same ethnic unit, all under a unitary designation is problematic in itself (Harrell 1990, 521). In addition is the choice of the name itself, which differs from the name representing ethnic identity: The Yi in Liangshan call themselves either Nuosu or Nasu, which means nothing but “people.”
[2] This is a custom practiced by many nations, as evidenced, for instance, by the terms “Inuit,” “Bantu,” “Magyar,” and “Alemannen.”
Names that they were earlier known by, such as Lolo or Yiren (the first is derived from a pejorative name, the second means barbarian), were perceived as discriminatory.The current name, Yi, is said to have been the result of a majority opinion in a survey of representatives of this nationality in the 1950s. But Yi informants indicate that the only thing actually debated was a new character for Yi. The sound was still a historical product forced on them by earlier emperors. According to many Yi, among themselves they prefer the traditional name for themselves, Nuosu (Harrell 1996b, 104 ff; Luohong 1996, 88—91).Territorial Boundaries
The Yi, the sixth-largest non-Han nationalityin the census of 1990, with 6.58 million people, are distributed across the provinces of Yunnan (4.06 million), Sichuan (1.79 million), Guizhou (0.71 million), and Guangxi (7,200). In contrast to two smaller nationalities, the Yi have no provincial-level autonomous region of their own, but only five autonomous prefectures (four in Yunnan, one in Sichuan), and ten autonomous counties (seven in Yunnan, two in Sichuan, and one in Guizhou). Proposals for creation of a province-level autonomous region uniting the Yi areas in Yunnan, Sichuan,
Social Hierarchization
The classification as a cruel and brutal slave-owner society is another issue challenged more and more by Yi scholars. It assigns to the Yi a relatively low status in the hierarchy of nationalities. The Yiareseen as the only slave-owner society that existed in China as late as the 1950s. This assessment not only seems to verify the Stalinist historical concept of social hierarchy (development from primitive society to slave-owning, feudal, capitalist, and socialist society) that perceived China to be a nation consisting of nationalities representing different stages of development, with the Han at the top of economical, societal, cultural, and political development. Thus the Han had a concept that allowed continuation of their traditional function of raising the societies of the ethnic minorities to the level of the Han, and thus of equalizing the various ethnic groups in the name of a modern theory (socialism). The Communist Party in its role as vanguard of all people living within the Chinese borders took over this traditional role of civilizing the national minorities. Henceforth, the Party decided which customs were useful, progressive, and in the interest of a people and which were not and thus were to be abolished. This classification made equality between the Han and the minorities impossible. They could not be equal because the Han stood at the top of the hierarchy, and the minorities belonged to different stages of development below and had to strive to catch up with the Han. The policy and mode of catching up was set by the Han.
This concept of hierarchization perpetuates and approves inequality and tutelage. The philosopher Michael Walzer has pointed out that the idea of a cultural hierarchy always poses a threat to the people, whose culture is devaluated. Hierarchies, said Walzer, are never “innocent,” because they tend
Economic and Social Aspects
China's recent development demonstrates that the practice of actual rights of self-administration requires an economic foundation. The bigger the economy of aregion, the greater is its maneuvering room vis-à-vis the center. And on the contrary, the more a region depends on the center or, correspondingly, a province, the less room it has for maneuvering. Autonomy is related not only to political decisions but also to economic strength.
Because the minority regions are among the poorest and least developed areas in China, their conditions for self-administration are not very good. Their economic and technological disadvantage when compared with other parts of China has, on the one hand, historical grounds. A large portion of the non-Han peoples has been, over the course of history, chased into poor regions. These peoples sealed themselves off from the outside in order not to be overwhelmed by the steadily increasing, land-gobbling Han population. On the other hand, the flawed, nationwide development policy of the 1960s and 1970s brought no progress for these areas.
In comparison with China as a whole and with the minority regions, Liangshan Prefecture ranks among the least developed regions, particularly when the economic potential of the Han-dominated prefectural capital of Xichang is not considered. The data in Table 13.1 demonstrate this quite clearly.
If we compare peasant per-capita income in the autonomous regions of Sichuan with the corresponding income in provincial-level autonomous regions, or with provinces that have a large portion of minority populations, the autonomous regions in Sichuan lie at the bottom end of the scale (Table 13.2).
Not only in comparison with other autonomous regions but also within Sichuan, Liangshan Prefecture is an especially poor region. Among the thirty autonomous prefectures in China, it was, in 1996, in terms of peasants' net income per capita, one of the poorest areas (793 yuan) (Zhongguo minzu tongji nianjian 1996, 283).
Twelve of the seventeen counties in Liangshan Prefecture in the mid-1990s were officially counted and registered as “poor counties” (pinkun xian); that is to say, they had a per capita income of less than 200 yuan per year (average: 129 yuan, less than the average per capita income of peasants for all of China at the end of the Cultural Revolution). In 1992, 860,000 of the 1.54 million Yi in Liangshan (55.8 percent) were counted as “very poor”; that is, their income was below the poverty line and they had a yearly income of less than 200 yuan, or US$25 (Qubi and Yang 1992, 33). With a 1992 peasant
| China | Sichuan | Autonomous Regions in China | Autonomous Regions in Sichuan | Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture 1989* | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SOURCES: Li Yihui (1993, 112); Qubi and Yang (1992, 32) | |||||
| *Newer data not available. | |||||
| Gross output value | 1,547 | 1,066 | 1,176 | 813 | no data |
| Income | 1,260 | 896 | 874 | 696 | no data |
| Gross output value of industry and agriculture | 2,393 | 1,729 | 1,731 | 984 | 542 |
| Agriculture | 670 | 589 | 724 | 547 | 314 |
| Industry | 1,723 | 1,131 | 1,007.5 | 437 | 228 |
| Financial revenue | 283 | 111 | n.a. | 86 | 77 |
| Peasant per-capita income | 683 | 505 | 312 | 357 | 317 |
| 1990 | 1994 | |
|---|---|---|
| SOURCES: Li Yihui (1993, 118); Zhongguo tongji nianjian (1995, 280); Zhongguo minzu tongji nianjian (1995, 188). | ||
| All China | 693 | 1,221 |
| Xinjiang Autonomous Region | 623 | 947 |
| Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region | 607 | 970 |
| Ningxia Autonomous Region | 534 | 867 |
| Qinghai Province | 514 | 869 |
| Guangxi Autonomous Region | 500 | 1,107 |
| Yunnan Province | 490 | 803 |
| Guizhou Province | 435 | 786 |
| Tibet Autonomous Region | 437 | 976 |
| Sichuan | 505 | 946 |
| Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture | 336 | 500 |
Certainly, Liangshan Prefecture has profited from the general economic prosperity of the last fifteen years. Still, the gap between minority areas and other parts of China is growing. And this despite the increased state subsidies.
The reform policies have visibly diminished the state tutelage of the peasantry and moved toward a kind of economic regime more suited to local conditions, but this has not in any way brought advantages to the autonomous prefecture. This is related to the following points: Even according to official reports, the prefecture has not been given anywhere near sufficient consideration with regard to the provision of credit, subsidies, foreign exchange, and materials by the center or the province (Zhongguo minzu jingji 1993, 26). The financial subsidies to the autonomous regions of Sichuan at the end of the 1980s were far less than those for other autonomous regions or provinces with a high proportion of minorities (see Table 13.3).
The dismantling of subventions has in addition led to a great strain on prefectural endurance. Many offices and industrial enterprises find themselves in no condition to pay wages or accounts on time.
| SOURCE: Li Yihui (1993, 115). | |
| NOTE: The figures for financial subsidies for autonomous regions of Sichuan also include provincial subsidies, so the subsidies from the center must be even less. | |
| * Newer data not available. | |
| All China | 262 |
| Inner Mongolia | 762 |
| Qinghai | 610 |
| Ningxia | 572 |
| Tibet | 505 |
| Xinjiang | 272 |
| Guizhou | 199 |
| Yunnan | 183 |
| Guangxi | 123 |
| Autonomous Regions in Sichuan | 128 |
In industrial colonization and the exploitation of raw materials, local interests are, as previously, not taken into consideration. The autonomous prefecture gets no fiscal advantage from them; the industrial colonization is directed mostly from outside and serves the extraction of cheap raw materials in the interest of enterprises outside the prefecture. Laborers are recruited outside the prefecture because of the low standard of local population: occupational training of the local population, which at most is undertaken only for simple activities, is widely left undone.
Han Chinese skilled personnel (technicians and skilled laborers), brought to the autonomous prefecture in the era before the reforms, moved back to their native regions or out to coastal regions because living conditions and living standards were better there. Thus the county of Zhaojue, one of the counties that was supposed to constitute a key point in the fight against poverty and which has a population that is 95 percent Yi, lost 995 skilled personnel between 1979 and 1992, of whom 235 were college graduates and 760 higher vocational-school graduates. Most of these were young people (Yang Jingchu 1994, 2).
Until the 1980s, trade in necessities for ethnic minorities was promoted and subsidized by the state. The dismantling of this practice of subsidies led to the collapse or weakening of the trade network.
Despoliation through deforestation, overgrazing, environmental pollution, and ecological destruction through industrial colonization have led to climatic change and lowering of the water table. Forested area in the three autonomous prefectures of Sichuan diminished from 29.4 percent at the beginning
The consequences of the transition to a “socialist” market economy also go beyond the economic sphere in Liangshan. For example, the removal of subsidies in the health and cultural sectors (free medical care and prevention of epidemics, free films and cultural activities) and the transfer of responsibility for these sectors to local authorities have led to the collapse of the health-care system and the discontinuance of cultural activities. Because of the local financial situation, clinics and health stations have been closed or made smaller. Epidemic diseases, which were thought to have been eliminated long ago, have broken out anew. In the three autonomous prefectures of Sichuan the number of local clinics diminished from 1,766 to 1,042 from 1978 to 1989, a reduction of 41 percent. Already in 1990, 53 percent of villages and 5 percent of towns and townships were without connections to the health-care-delivery network (Li Yihui 1993, 123—24, 436).
Similarly, in the educational and training sector considerable deterioration has taken place. In 1996, only 40 percent of Yi children in Liangshan attended school (in comparison to over 96 percent in Sichuan and 97 percent in the People's Republic of China, according to official reports). Only about 20 percent of girls attended school. In poor areas the school attendance rate was just 10 percent. Sixty percent of Yi over twelve years of age, according to official figures, were illiterate or semi-illiterate.
[3] The population census of 1982 shows a much higher rate for the Yi in Liangshan area: 76.1 percent, of which are 62.0 percent male and 90.2 percent female illiterates. The illiteracy rate for Sichuan overall was 32.0 percent, and for the autonomous regions in Sichuan 62.3 percent (cf. Liu Hongkang, 1988, 342).
In spite of all the touted anti-illiteracy campaigns, this situation is little changed since 1980 (58.05 percent) (Heberer 1984b, 281). The return to family farming, which made the entry of children into the family workforce profitable again, the growing costs of school attendance, and not least the weakening of the school network are the reasons for this development. Related to this is the fact that the number of primary and secondary schools in the autonomous regions of Sichuan diminished by 3,135, or 35.5 percent, from 1980 to 1989, and their number of graduates by 33.2 percent (Li Yihui 1993, 122). In 1992—94 in Zhaojue County alone, only 3 of 80 applicants secured a place in a university, none of them Yi (Jiang , Lu, and Dan 1994, 193). Correspondingly low is the number of Yi with a university degree (the Yi are last among the nationalities with more than 500,000 people). According to the 1990 censusIt is interesting to look at a list of problems given by the magazine Minzu as most irritating to the peasants in Liangshan Prefecture. These problems do not appear much different from those in Han Chinese districts, but they are understood by many Yi as results of “Han policies”:
The prices for goods that are urgently needed in agriculture (such as means of production, diesel oil, chemical fertilizers, and insecticides) are rising faster than the prices for farm products, with the result that farm incomes are diminishing.
State support monies for the agricultural sector in poverty areas (for the purchase of means of production, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, diesel oil, and so on) come significantly late. They are often paid only after the agricultural season for which they were needed is already over.
There are practically no agricultural experts in the rural areas of Liangshan Prefecture.
The prestige of cadres is at a nadir, because they often occupy themselves only as collectors of taxes and fees, and otherwise do not bother with the demands and needs of the peasantry.
The rising number of false products (less valuable or worthless imitations) in the areas of seeds, diesel oil, fertilizers, and pesticides has developed into a considerable problem that has negative effects on agriculture.
The medical network in the villages is practically shattered: therearehardly any doctors or medications, to the point where the death rate has begun to rise.
Drug taking, dealing, and addiction are rising drastically, without any intervention by the authorities. (Wang Linlu 1994, 11)
In other parts of China, including, importantly, the province of Sichuan, peasants have defended themselves by force. For this reason, local authorities rightly fear that the potential for dissatisfaction in Liangshan could increase the potential for conflict in the province as a whole, particularly as the disturbances in Lhasa in 1993 over inflation have shown how quickly economic dissatisfaction can transform into politically and ethnically inspired demands.
“Unhealthy” Customs and Habits
Socially and economically caused dissatisfaction can mount when, simultaneously with economic liberalization, the often-intentional interference in Yi customs does not stop. As in the country as a whole, there is now a retraditionalization in Yiareas. The role of clans, shamans, and magicians, as well as that of religion, is growing.
Since the 1950s, “healthy” and “unhealthy” customs and practices have been differentiated. Unhealthy ones should be eliminated; healthy ones preserved. Because this definition has never been precisely clarified, it always has
The Liangshan ribao, the bilingual daily newspaper in Liangshan, reported in 1986 the prohibition of a predeath ceremony for an elderly couple. In this traditional ceremony all the friends and relatives assemble, bring gifts, and celebrate a communal feast for several days. The prohibition was announced by the prefectural government and was justified on grounds of “waste,” even though the peasants used only their own money and consumed their own goods (Liangshan ribao, 5 June 1986). It is easy to imagine the feelings such a prohibition must have called forth among those affected. In 1996 a journal on nationalities affairs complained that, on the occasion of 383 funeral rituals in Meigu County,5,202 head of cattle were slaughtered (Lü 1996, 104). In one township of this county alone 16.5 percent of the township revenues were said to have been used for “superstitious activities.” In some areas half the income was reportedly spent on alcohol. According to the economic rationality of the Party, such behavior is wasteful. But, first, Yi may have a different rationality related to traditional social obligations (“moral economy”). Second, the state's interference is perceived as “Han” pressure on the Yiand their traditional customs. And last but not least, such “waste” could be interpreted as a kind of ethnic collective action that is more or less instinctive, and as a form of opposition against the perceived pressure of the Han.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, customs, practices, and festivals are again supposed to be officially respected. And in the constitution it says explicitly, “They [all nationalities] are free to preserve or reform unhealthy customs and habits of their own.” At the same time, in the name of measures against “unhealthy customs” and “superstition,” officials interfere in the system of customs. Because local authorities understand themselves to be representatives of local minorities, it is in practice not possible to resist such measures. This will be made clear in the following example of the bimo.
The Renaissance of the Bimo Animism and animistic ideas shaped and shape the religious thinking of the Yi. Sickness, death, and misfortune all are ascribed to the influence of spirits. Because spirits can bring evil, there were many rituals to keep them under control. The bimo as priest and magician was an intermediary between spirits and people (see Bamo Ayi, chapter 8 in this volume). During the Democratic Reforms in the 1950s, in the course of which the traditional structure of power among the Yi was eliminated, the activities of bimo and sunyi (shamans that have a lower social position than the bimo) were classified as “superstitious activities” and prohibited and their practitioners persecuted. In times of political radicalization, the bimo and sunyi were designated as charlatans and class enemies and thus
[4] In 1996, for the first time an article in an academic journal spoke of a special “bimo religion” (bijiao) (Pu 1996, 66—72).
In 1984 the State Council initiated a change with its decision that healers and magicians like bimo were to be dealt with like intellectuals. From then on, bimo could practice their activities for payment. Now there is again a training system in which young people from traditional bimo families are connected with the experience of their forebears. The bimo once again is part of the everyday life of the Yi, for officials as well as for ordinary members of that nationality. The crux of the reinstitution of the bimo was not a friendly disposition of the center. The above-mentioned collapse of the health-care network led already at the beginning of the 1980s to a resurgence of bimo and sunyi activities. These practitioners were the only ones in a position to fill the resulting gap, especially since the populace lacked the money to pay for increasingly expensive medical services.
The deterioration of health care, which was expressed, among other ways, by the fact that qualified doctors emigrated from poor areas and returned to their home districts, or changed to more remunerative occupations because of the low income in the health sector, stimulated the revival of bimo activities. In local clinics, severe diseases could in the main no longer be taken care of, and in the case of less severe diseases the local population often did not go to hospitals simply because of the cost. The roads to clinics are often long and difficult for rural inhabitants, and because of a lack of transport they often require a long walk on foot. Treatment was—and is—too expensive for peasants, who must pay the cost out of their own pockets, and anyone unable to pay would be quickly turned away from a clinic. In addition, the belief of the Yi population in the healing arts of bimo is as great as ever. News of healing results gets around quickly, and bad results, by contrast, can be attributed to supernatural powers. On top of that is the psychic function of the bimo, undervalued by the doctors of scientific medicine, as well as their knowledge of traditional healing procedures (Li Zhongfang 1994, 30—36). In the reinstitution of bimo activities the state thus was simply reacting to a change that was already in full course.
Still, it would be mistaken to attribute the bimo phenomenon solely to deficiencies in health care. And the prestige that the bimo have once again is not to be understood only in religious terms. Within Yi society the bimo assume the function of intellectuals, because of their knowledge and experience. We know from social anthropology that magicians function as guardians of knowledge in illiterate societies. In a rapidly changing world change will often be perceived as a threat, and nostalgia for the past will be
In case of illness, the bimo attempts to drive out evil spirits by magical means. Most Yi still believe that illnesses are caused by spirits and demons and can be healed only by exorcism. During the ceremonies, the bimo performs rituals according to the severity of the illness and the financial circumstances of the family.
Bimo keep in their houses many Yidocuments, which they consult in cases of celebration, sickness, divination, marriage, and every kind of magical ceremony. These documents are composed in Yi script. The Yi script could survive over the centuries only because the bimo passed it on to their pupils and followers. Ordinary Yi had no chance to learn this script.
In the area of medicine, doctors from the Han nationality usually deny that the bimo have any medical abilities. But every Yiwith whom I spoke, even local officials, expressed high regard for the bimo and their healing art. Peasants as well as officials agreed that the bimo possess many types of knowledge: knowledge of the Yi script, Yi history, meteorology, geology, and anthropology. On the negative side, Han Chinese officials most often mentioned the killing of animals for sacrifices, “interference in production,” elements of exploitation, and superstition. But every Yi can give examples of miraculous healing from his or her own experience. A local official, for example, reported that his uncle had gotten only a diagnosis of end-stage liver cancer from the doctors in the county hospital. He had been advised to go home, since he would not live much longer. The uncle then placed himself in the care of a bimo and a year later went to the county hospital for an examination, where he was given a clean bill of health. A province-level Yi official likewise reported being healed by a bimo. As a child, he had been bitten by a rabid animal. The bimo had taken a young hen and first held it under the child's arm; then he held its beak in the child's mouth and had him blow two or three times into the hen's mouth. The bimo had next drowned the hen in cold water and plucked out the feathers; then he investigated the color of the skin and other things, and after that the innards. In the official's case, the skin and innards had shown changes from which the bimo, according to
While many Han believe that bimo are consulted only by those who cannot raise money for treatment in a hospital, many Yi contradict this belief. The decision is based not only on the availability of money but also on trust and belief in the healing abilities of the shamans, as well as the continued existence of animistic and animatistic ideas.
But bimo are called for more than medical purposes, even today. In protracted bad weather, in the face of threatened bad harvests, in time of death, in questions of favorable and unfavorable outcomes, weddings, and so on—in all these situations the village bimo is present, and he performs the necessary ceremonies to placate or expel the spirits whose influence is still credited for most natural occurrences.
From the end of the 1950s the pursuits of the bimo were officially disapproved. A small portion of bimo went on to be educated as barefoot doctors (certainly the lesser bimo), but the overwhelming majority refused this offer. In knowledge, education, reputation, and social position, they felt themselves superior to doctors. Bimo were enrolled in “courses of study,” with the object of “reeducation.” Their activities, condemned as superstition, were forbidden, but in the villages bimo continued to practice. Even in the Cultural Revolution, when all bimo and sunyi without exception were defined as class enemies and “objects of class struggle,” attempts to root out the shamans and their activities were unsuccessful. They and their store of beliefs were too closely attached to the worldview of the Yi, and they continued and still continue to count as an important component of Yi society, from which almost no Yi distance themselves.
Two still-practicing bimo in the county of Meigu—Nidi Ati and Qubi Vujisse—explained that there have been bimo for twenty-eight generations (counting one generation as twenty-five to twenty-eight years). One can distinguish three categories of bimo: (a) those who understand the sacred texts and have read many of them (little bimo); (b) those who, in addition to this, can also ask the gods for help and understand psychic healing methods (middling bimo); and (c) those who, in addition to having the abilities mentioned in the first two categories, also command the funeral ritual (great bimo). The training lasts, as it always has, fifteen years. Bimo are scientists who have discovered knowledge in the areas of history, medicine, meteorology, geology,
According to these two bimo, bimo can save 90 percent of those afflicted with spirit illnesses before they die. But they understand that they cannot heal all illnesses. In the case of certain sicknesses, such as infectious diseases, it is better to go to one of the hospitals with modern equipment. Bimo strength is in psychological healing methods, supported by herbal remedies.
Even in the Cultural Revolution many young men demanded to be schooled as bimo, for several reasons. First, the deficiency in medical care made substitute care through the bimo network necessary; second, the schools were closed for a while and young people had few opportunities for education; third, the bimo and their professional standing enjoyed a high reputation among the Yi. Bimo are tolerated again today, but they remain a thorn in the side of Han cadres, who hope to convince the bimo“through educational measures” to give up their activities. But at most this succeeds only in very rare cases. The aforementioned Nidi Ati, among others, explained that the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing had invited him to demonstrate his knowledge and skills there for scientific purposes. This he declined; he would transmit his knowledge only to his successors.
Though bimo today continue to possess great prestige in rural areas, it is declining in urban areas. There the opinion has spread that modern medicine is superior to archaic methods of the bimo in many respects and that modern hospitals “get better results with a lot of spirits” than do bimo (according to patients in the county hospitals at Meigu). With the increasing level of education and the popularization of modern medical and scientific knowledge, shamanism (including animism and animatism) is doomed to disappear from Yi society. However, for many young people bimo figure increasingly as scientific authorities who, at best, know the Yi, their history, their customs and usages, as well as their script (which certainly plays a role), and in rare cases work together with the Han.
Language Policy
At the beginning of the 1980s Yi script was released again in a reformed version. As early as the middle of the 1970s members of the Yi elite had intervened with provincial authorities and argued that, without their own script, the rate of illiteracy and school attendance could not be improved. The reintroduction was, at the same time, an expression of the failure of the policy to compel the Yi and many other people to use the Chinese language, along
Although the popularization of the Yi script has occurred at least in the Yi primary schools, and there is one newspaper, one magazine, and a limited selection of books in the Yi script, there are numerous problems. The language and writing are widely restricted to primary schools, at best; Chinese becomes the primary language beginning in middle school. Because of this, the level of Yi language remains restricted, and the language and writing remain insufficiently developed. Increasingly, Yi language is being degraded to a language of the rural population.
Yi-language speakers remain handicapped in comparison to Han speakers. It is a widespread conviction among Yi, particularly among cadres and skilled personnel, that bilingual education is “useless” because only knowledge of Chinese is required for learning trades or gaining access to wider educational opportunities. Because of this, the Yi script has only a limited area of usefulness and thus has no future. In any case students have enough to do just to learn Chinese. For this reason this circle of people is widely uninterested in bilingual education for further growth, but only in Chinese-language education (Zhang, Yu, and Ma 1992, 26). This particularly applies to people who speak only broken or no Yi, or who primarily speak Chinese. This circle includes a high percentage of people who live in cities or near cities, who have higher education (generally in a Han environment), or are active as officials.
Most of the children of officials or intellectuals, from whom the elite stem, generally know no Yi. In this way, the elite becomes linguistically Sinified. Whoever has enjoyed an education in a Han Chinese environment and speaks Chinese instead of his or her native language counts as more loyal and more integrable—in other words, less inclined to ethnonationalistic tendencies. But Chinese is not only, as is often maintained, a lingua franca. It is a means of transport for Han Chinese value concepts and norms of behavior, a not unimportant contributor to a process of cultural assimilation.
Where smaller speech communities count as “backward,” where such an image is adopted by the elite of an ethnic group, where language is thus understood as a symbol for being dominated, the first step toward the extinction of the language has already been taken.
Birth Planning Policy
Birth planning policy can also lead to conflict. According to the population law of the province of Sichuan and the corresponding regulations of Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture, members of ethnic minorities can have two, or in special circumstances, three children. Bearing more than three children is not allowed (Liangshan Yizu Zizhizhou 1991, 122—30). For this and other reasons, it is not surprising that the rate of natural increase is higher