1. Robert Slater, Warrior Statesman: The Life of Moshe Dayan (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 352-66.

2. C.A. 604/72, Yurman v. "Hasneh" Insurance, 28(1) P.D. 141 (1974).

3. Ronnie recovered, completed his studies, and joined the Physics Department at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The Yurman decision was signed by the Court on 26 November 1973. Ronnie had been wounded on 16 October. It appears that Agranat had circulated his opinion during the war and that in the intervening weeks Justices Sussman and Kahan had completed their majority opinion. Retired Chief Justice Olshan, whose only child, Yoram, died in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War while serving as a reservist, wrote about the pain of a parent whose child died in war: "I always thought that I could feel the pain of these parents . . . that with time . . . the wound heals, and I believed that logic and persuasion could help in keeping the depression under control. But my misfortune taught me that it is a mistake for one who never experienced this to think that he can understand and feel . . . what transpires in the heart of the . . . parent. . . . continue

[E]xcept for when I sleep, not even a moment passes without my seeing Yoram before me." Olshan, Din u-Dvarim, 378-79.

4. Agranat held that the Court had jurisdiction to amend the decision against the driver to include a proviso that the judgment should not affect the insurance company's defense. Yurman, 153.

5. The Hebrew words bituah (insurance) and bitahon (security) have the same root.

6. As represented most forcefully in Haim Goury, Pirhey Esh [Flowers of Fire], the most popular collection of poems published after the War of Independence. See Dan Miron, Mul ha-Ah ha-Shotek [Facing the Silent Brother] (Jerusalem: Keter, 1992), 199-234.

7. William B. Quandt, Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986), 112. Sharm-al-Sheik, returned to Egypt under the peace treaty, was conquered by Israel in the Six Day War.

8. Yurman, 153.

9. The watershed event in the Watergate scandal, known as the Saturday Night Massacre, when President Nixon fired Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, reported that Attorney General Elliot Richardson and his deputy, William Ruckelshaus, had resigned, and announced that the Office of the Special Prosecutor was being abolished, occurred on 20 October 1973. In the preceding days the media had focused simultaneously on Nixon's negotiations with the special prosecutor and his handling of the raging war in the Middle East. Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 920-42.

10. Fighting, particularly on the Syrian front, erupted frequently. Israel, Egypt, and Syria were negotiating disengagement agreements. Henry Kissinger, who launched his shuttle diplomacy then, did not make a secret of his preference for dealing with Meir and Dayan. Any of these reasons militated in favor of stability. See, for example, Golda Meir, My Life (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976), 378-81; Moshe Dayan, Avne Derekh [Story of My Life] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1976), 724-35; Abba Eban, Personal Witness: Israel through My Eyes (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1992), 554-55, 562-63.

11. See, generally, Zeev Segal, "The Power to Probe into Matters of Vital Public Importance," 58 Tulane L. Rev. 941 (1984).

12. Matti Golan, "Vaadat Hakira Mamlakhtit Turkav ba-Yamim ha-Krovim [A Commission of Inquiry Will Be Established Shortly]," Ha-Arets, 19 November 1973, 1. The news about Ben-Gurion appeared on the same page. Ben-Gurion died on 1 December 1973.

13. The argument about favoritism rested on the fact that in 1967 Yadin, as advisor to Prime Minister Eshkol, had strongly lobbied to appoint Dayan minister of defense. Dan Hanegbi, "Yadin," Yediot Aharonot Magazine: Yamim, 6 July 1984, 12-13. Laskov was appointed military ombudsman by Dayan after two years of unemployment. Mordecai Naor, Laskov (Jerusalem: Keter, 1988), 334, 337. See also Slater, Warrior, 380.

14. Editorial, "Herkev Meule [Excellent Composition]," Ha-Arets, 23 November 1973, 5. For praise from public figures, see Haviv Kenaan, "Reactions," ibid., 22 November 1973, 2.

15. Of the 120 seats in the Knesset, the Alliance won 51 (down from 56), and continue

the Likud 39 (up from 33). RATZ, a new party founded by Shulamit Aloni, won 3 seats, and MAFDAL held onto its 10 seats.

16. Indeed, it may well be that during the elections of 31 December 1973 the people did not have the courage to perform the task and were hoping that the commission would do it for them. It could also be that the commission interpreted the popular vote in favor of Golda Meir's government as an indication that the people still trusted its leadership. A poll taken during the last week of November 1973 reflected the public confusion. Almost 56 percent of the respondents believed that some leaders should draw personal conclusions (a euphemism for resignation); slightly more than 24 percent believed that personal conclusions should not be drawn; and just under 20 percent had no opinion. More than 50 percent of those who favored personal conclusions could not decide which leaders should be required to resign; 73 percent believed that Dayan should not be replaced. Ha-Arets, 23 November 1973, 1-2.

17. For a description of public anger expressed at Dayan, see, for example, Slater, Warrior, 378; "Waterloo Be-Bar-Ilan [Waterloo at Bar-Ilan]," Ha-Olam ha-Zeh, 25 December 1974, 15. For a discussion of the protest movements, see Gad Barzilai, Demokratyah be-Milhamot [A Democracy in Wartime] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1992), 163-73.

18. The full reports were declassified following a petition to the Court by Maariv . See "Bagats Maariv: ha-Nimukim ha-Ikariyim [The Maariv Petition: The Main Arguments]," Maariv Magazine, 24 September 1993, 11.

19. The quotes are from Eban, Personal Witness, 564. The following is a sample of the criticism after the report had been submitted: in the cabinet meeting, Yitzhak Rabin, then minister of labor, called the report "fundamentally defective" and suggested that it be returned to the commission (Yosef Harif, "Tsfouyim Zaazouim ba-Memshalah uva-Maarakh be-Ikvot ha-Tviot le-Hadahat Moshe Dayan [Shake-ups Expected in the Cabinet and the Alliance following the Demands to Impeach Moshe Dayan]," Maariv, 4 April 1974, 1); a front page editorial in Davar accused the report of applying a double standard ("Doh Agranat: Tsarikh le-Vatsea, u-Mutar le-Vaker [The Agranat Report: Must Be Implemented and Can Be Criticized]," Davar, 3 April 1974, 1); Yitzhak Ben-Aharon, Labor's venerated leader, called the day the report was submitted "a dark day for Israeli law" (quoted in Eliyahu Salpeter, "Mehol ha-shedim [Dance Macabre]," Ha-Arets, 5 April 1974, 16); the Moked Party in the Knesset (left wing) condemned the report as a part of a cover-up ("Moked: Doh Agranat Meavet u-Mehape [Moked: The Agranat Report Distorts and Covers Up]," Maariv, 4 April 1974, 2); Amnon Rubinstein, Israel's leading constitutional law expert, opined that the report was flawed because it ignored a whole body of Israeli law related to the powers of the minister of defense ("Doh Agranat: He'arot Mishpatiyot [The Agranat Report: Legal Comments]," Ha-Arets, 9 April 1974, 11).

Although public condemnation was widespread, there were also voices of caution, defending the commission: Editorial, "Vaadat Agranat veha-Politikah [The Agranat Commission and Politics]," Ha-Arets, 5 April 1974, 15; Shalom Rosenfeld, "Medinat Mishpat oh Medinat Lintch? [A State of Law or a State of Lynching?]," Maariv, 5 April 1974, 13-4.

20. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon Vaadat Agranat: Vaadat ha-Hakira Mil- soft

hemet Yom ha-Kippurim [Agranat Commission Report: Report of the Commission of Inquiry, the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 44.

21. Ibid., 34-43. The commission recommended that the head of the intelligence services and other intelligence officers no longer serve in the intelligence branch, that the chief of the Southern Command be suspended, and that the service of the chief of staff be terminated.

22. Ibid., 19-21.

20. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon Vaadat Agranat: Vaadat ha-Hakira Mil- soft

hemet Yom ha-Kippurim [Agranat Commission Report: Report of the Commission of Inquiry, the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 44.

21. Ibid., 34-43. The commission recommended that the head of the intelligence services and other intelligence officers no longer serve in the intelligence branch, that the chief of the Southern Command be suspended, and that the service of the chief of staff be terminated.

22. Ibid., 19-21.

20. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon Vaadat Agranat: Vaadat ha-Hakira Mil- soft

hemet Yom ha-Kippurim [Agranat Commission Report: Report of the Commission of Inquiry, the Yom Kippur War] (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1975), 44.

21. Ibid., 34-43. The commission recommended that the head of the intelligence services and other intelligence officers no longer serve in the intelligence branch, that the chief of the Southern Command be suspended, and that the service of the chief of staff be terminated.

22. Ibid., 19-21.

23. The Kahan Commission, appointed in 1983 to investigate Israeli involvement in the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, was bolder in its evaluation of the responsibility of the civilian leadership. While retaining the approach taken by the Agranat Commission, it gave a broader interpretation to the notion of "personal responsibility" and found that Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon was so responsible. But even the Kahan Commission was cautious not to intervene too heavily in political affairs and couched its recommendations in ambiguous language. Sharon was removed from his position as minister of defense but remained in the cabinet as minister without portfolio. See Segal, Power to Probe , 969-70.

24. Yaacov Hisdai, "Pirsum ha-Doh Tsoreh Leumi [Publication of the Report Is a National Imperative]," Maariv Magazine , 24 September 1993, 12-13.

25. See n. 19 above.

26. Zvi Lanir, Ha-Haftaah ha-Bsisit: Modiin be-Mashber [Fundamental Surprise: The National Intelligence Crisis] (Tel Aviv: Ha-Kibbutz ha-Meuhad, 1983), 55-59.

27. See, for example, Meron Medzini, Ha-Yehudia ha-Gea: Golda Meir va-Hazon Yisrael: Biyografyah politit [The Proud Jewess: Golda Meir and the Vision of Israel] (Jerusalem: Idanim, 1990), 359-409; Eban, Personal Witness , 492-555; Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), 459.

28. See, for example, Lanir, Ha-Haftaah , 55-59; Uri Milstein, Krisah ve-Likhah: mi-Sadat le-Arafat [The Lesson of a Collapse: From Sadat to Arafat] (Kiron: Seridut, 1993), 96-98.

29. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 49.

30. See, for example, David Elazar's letter of resignation: "I refute the fundamental approach of the Commission regarding the respective jurisdictions of the minister of defense and the chief of staff. . . . In reality . . . the minister of defense was an operational authority above the chief of staff and all the operational and tactical plans before the war were submitted for his approval." Ibid., 146.

31. Ibid., 46, quoting Dayan's speech to the General Command on 21 May 1973: "I am now speaking as the representative of the government, also on the basis of information. We, the cabinet, say to the general command, gentlemen, please get ready for war where those threatening to open it are Egypt and Syria."

30. See, for example, David Elazar's letter of resignation: "I refute the fundamental approach of the Commission regarding the respective jurisdictions of the minister of defense and the chief of staff. . . . In reality . . . the minister of defense was an operational authority above the chief of staff and all the operational and tactical plans before the war were submitted for his approval." Ibid., 146.

31. Ibid., 46, quoting Dayan's speech to the General Command on 21 May 1973: "I am now speaking as the representative of the government, also on the basis of information. We, the cabinet, say to the general command, gentlemen, please get ready for war where those threatening to open it are Egypt and Syria."

32. See Eli Zeira, Milhemet Yom Ha-Kippurim: Mitos mul Metsiut [The October '73 War: Myth against Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1993), 106-7.

33. Ibid., 242-43.

32. See Eli Zeira, Milhemet Yom Ha-Kippurim: Mitos mul Metsiut [The October '73 War: Myth against Reality] (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 1993), 106-7.

33. Ibid., 242-43.

34. Dayan's legal advisor was Elyakim Rubinstein, who later played important roles in the Camp David accords and the peace treaty with Jordan. Zeira claimed that Agranat himself advised him not to be represented by an attorney. Ibid., 190. David Elazar also said that he did not consult an attorney. Yaacov Erez, "Daddo: Ani lo Kofer be-Ahrayut ha-Ramatkal [Daddo: I Do Not Deny the Responsibility of the Chief of Staff]," Maariv , 5 April 1974, 1. break

35. Agranat relied on several sources, among them S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Law , 2d ed. (London: Stevens, 1968), 170-71, and Ivor Jennings, The British Constitution , 5th ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 153-54. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 44.

36. See discussion on p. 216.

37. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 26.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

38. The report's description of Meir's government can only be read as criticism: the commission described how the institution previously in charge of security matters--the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs--was expanded to include almost all members of the cabinet "for the sole purpose of guaranteeing thereby the secrecy of its deliberations" and thus to cure the problem of leakages. As a result, the committee ceased to perform its original function--serious deliberation of national security. This task, in turn, was vested in the "kitchen." Members of the "kitchen" who did not live in Tel Aviv did not take part in the critical decisions made on Yom Kippur. Ibid., 27.

39. Ibid., 28. The commission recommended that during war the government should authorize the prime minister to establish a war cabinet of not more than five persons who would make decisions related to the war, thereby permitting other ministers to continue to attend to other important matters.

40. Ibid., 30. The commission recommended the appointment of a national security council in the prime minister's office. The commission fell short of censuring the government for having failed to implement similar recommendations made in 1963.

41. Ibid., 45.

42. Ibid., 63, 80.

43. Ibid., 58.

44. Ibid., 95.

45. Ibid., 94.

46. Ibid.

47. See Uri Ben-Eliezer, "Uma be-Madim u-Milhama: Yisrael bi-Shnotehah ha-Rishonot [The Nation-in-Arms and War: Israel in Its First Years]," Zmanim 59 (1994): 50; Baruch Kimmerling, "Al Militarism be-Yisrael [Militarism in Israeli Society]," Teoryah u-Vikoret 4 (1993): 123.

48. This was also true about the feelings in the army. See Zeev Schiff, "Retia Psihologit be-Tsahal Midoh Agranat [A Psychological Reaction in the Army against the Agranat Report]," Ha-Arets , 2 February 1975, 3.

49. See Moshe Negbi, Namer shel Neyar [Paper Tiger: The Struggle for Press Freedom in Israel] (Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim, 1985), 37-40.

50. The Alliance's slogan during the 1973 election campaign, before the war.

51. See n. 19 above.

52. See, for example, Uzi Benziman, "Sodiyut Mugzemet [Exaggerated Secrecy]," Ha-Arets , 11 December 1973, 9.

53. "As we mention these phenomena, it has not been our aim to ask for correction of a personal wrong. Our main aim is to explain that the tense--and oftentimes foul--atmosphere . . . could have impaired the credibility of the . . . [commission], and turned our very onerous mission almost unbearable." Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 63. break

54. See, for example, Gaby Baron, "Keshe-Hitbakesh ha-Shofet Agranat Lehagiv al ha-Doh Histapek Etmol be-Hafrahat Anney-Ashan mi-Miktarto [When Justice Agranat Was Asked Yesterday to React to the Report, He Only Puffed His Pipe]," Yediot Aharonot , 31 January 1975, 1.

55. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 61.

56. Ibid., 62.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 63.

59. Ibid.

55. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 61.

56. Ibid., 62.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 63.

59. Ibid.

55. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 61.

56. Ibid., 62.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 63.

59. Ibid.

55. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 61.

56. Ibid., 62.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 63.

59. Ibid.

55. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 61.

56. Ibid., 62.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 63.

59. Ibid.

60. "Journalists and publishers who take the liberty to publish such things cannot argue that it is in the public interest. The Law decides what is permissible and what is forbidden in the public interest, and once the legislature has spoken all arguments about the public interest are terminated." Ibid., 64.

61. Ibid.

60. "Journalists and publishers who take the liberty to publish such things cannot argue that it is in the public interest. The Law decides what is permissible and what is forbidden in the public interest, and once the legislature has spoken all arguments about the public interest are terminated." Ibid., 64.

61. Ibid.

62. See discussion on pp. 11, 112.

63. But see his classified opinion, in the late 1960s, sustaining the censorship of a book on Eichmann's abduction, discussed in chap. 10, n. 8.

64. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 62-63.

65. See discussion on p. 42.

66. The commission had to decide whether it would allow the officers to conduct cross-examinations of witnesses and bring evidence to refute charges against them. At stake were sections 15(a) and (b) of the Commissions of Inquiry Law (1968), which stated that persons who might be damaged by the inquiry could defend themselves before the commission, through the presentation of evidence or through cross-examination. See Commissions of Inquiry Law, 23 L.S.I. 32 (1968) as amended 26 L.S.I. 30 (1972) and 33 L.S.I. (1979). The commission decided that a literal application of these sections would "absolutely undermine the inquiry, by irreparable entanglement of its processes" and gave the law an excessively narrow interpretation that denied the right to conduct a cross-examination or bring evidence, when the commission intended to rest its conclusions on the officer's own testimony or on documents to which he had been a party. Vaadat Agranat, Din ve-Heshbon , 15-16. General Shmuel Gonen, chief of the Southern Command during the war, who was suspended by the commission, petitioned the Court twice, arguing that this interpretation violated his rights and the statutory language. The Court denied his petitions, reasoning that justice did not require judicial intervention. H.C. 128/74, Shmuel Gonen v. Vaadat ha-Hakirah , 28(2) P.D. 80 (1974); H.C. 469/74, Shmuel Gonen v. Vaadat ha-Hakirah , 29(1) P.D. 635 (1975).

67. This was so both because two of the Court's most senior justices were members of the commission and because the public perceived the denial of Gonen's petition as an effort by the Court to assist the commission.