I

Decleva Caizzi points out that it is in the Hellenistic period that we find the emergence of stereotypes of philosophers, that is, images of philoso-

[2] It might be objected that the question, "How am I to live?" is the entry point for ethical reflection in all periods of Greek ethics and does not specifically characterize the Hellenistic period. This is true, but it is also true that in this period the question acquires a new urgency, both in that ordinary people are more self-consciously aware of its importance and in that philosophy as a whole is more sharply focused on ethical answers to it.

phers which show aspects of their theories in their way of life and behavior. We are dependent for this, of course, on the biographical material in authors like Diogenes Laertius, and it is obvious that most of this reveals more about the thought patterns of the originators of the material than it does about its subjects. Nevertheless, Decleva Caizzi is surely right that these stories are of great value in showing that philosophers were expected to act in a way revealing of their theories. And this expectation does seem to be decisively new. We have, for example, no comparable stereotype of Plato or even Aristotle. Their "biographies" contain much material, most of it transparently projected from the works, but no illustrative images of this kind. There is a large amount of this kind of material about Socrates, but it proves precisely the point at issue. The stories, anecdotes, and so on, told about Socrates reflect the philosophical school for which the author is claiming Socrates as figurehead. The stories show great variety because in the Hellenistic period Stoics and Skeptics laid claim to Socrates as a forefather,^[3] as well as hedonists,^[4] in competition with the pictures we find in Xenophon and Plato. Aristotle's ethics requires, given the stress he lays on the development of dispositions, that one's actions express one's ethical beliefs; but he only once makes the point in connection with appearance and details of behavior—his notorious claim that the will have a deep voice and will not hurry along.^[5] And the result is not very happy. But Theophrastus' Characters develops in a quite thorough way the thought that the kind of character trait you have will show up in the kind of thing you do and your general appearance.^[6] The Characters develops this only for particular traits, but the idea is not far off that the priorities and dominant concerns in your life as a whole will find expression in the kinds of things you do and the way you present yourself to and interact with others.

Decleva Caizzi contrasts the images of Zeno and Epicurus that we find preserved in Hellenistic biography, and she notes a significant contrast. Zeno's image is that of someone setting himself apart from most people in a striking way. He makes a point of his poverty and of the independence of the powerful which his philosophical stance entitles him to, at

[3] See A. A. Long, "Socrates in Hellenistic Philosophy," CQ 38 (1988): 150—171.

[4] The Cyrenaics claimed descent from Socrates, and Diogenes Laertius sees them this way, listing them as Socratics in book 2. For the tradition of Socrates as hedonist, see the papyrus fragment P. Köln 205 (discussed by M. Schofield, "Coxon's Parmenides," Phronesis 32 [1987]: 349-359).

[5] Aristotle Eth. Nic . 1125a12-16.

[6] Thus grossness and stinginess show up in one's appearance; cowardice about the gods shows up in silly, superstitious behavior over trivialities; failures of intelligence show up in tactless comments at weddings, boring chatter to strangers, and so on.

least in his own eyes. By contrast the details of Epicurus' life do not stand out, and the Epicurean school makes no attempt to show their leader as a striking or dominant personality. I find this contrast convincing, and my comments are limited to details. I wonder whether this self-presentation by Zeno is linked as closely as Decleva Caizzi suggests to a specifically Stoic conception of the philosophical life, rather than a Cynic or Socratic one. And I have a few comments to make on what she says about Epicurus' image, and the accessibility, and the godlike nature, of the Epicurean final end.

Decleva Caizzi does not, of course, underestimate the Cynic elements in the image of Zeno that she discusses. But she also claims that it shows something important about Stoicism, and that Zeno's emphatic poverty, for example, shows some kind of modification of the Stoic view that wealth is a preferred indifferent. It seems to me that there are more problems than she suggests in combining this kind of ostentatious poverty and at times antisocial behavior with Stoic ethics as we know that from our major sources.^[7] If this is so, then Zeno's image is not the right image for Stoicism, as that developed after Chrysippus, and I think that some later Stoics were right to find it embarrassing and to distance themselves from it.^[8]

Decleva Caizzi mentions Zeno's uncompromising attitude to Antigonus as an example of a consciously adopted philosophical attitude, comparing it with the famous stories about Diogenes and Alexander. I would like to note that Zeno's attitude can also be explained in political rather than philosophical terms, but I do not have enough knowledge of the historical background to pursue this.^[9] So I shall concentrate on Zeno's poverty. Decleva Caizzi mentions many stories which indeed show a self-conscious, didactic use of poverty, surely meant to recall Socrates, and I won't repeat them. What I would like to stress is that this sits ill with some other facts. One is that Zeno brought a lot of money to Athens and

[7] Cicero De finibus 3; Diogenes Laertius 7.84-131; Arius Didymus ap. Stob. Ecl . 2.57.13-116.18. Arius and Diogenes derive from common sources, which seem to be textbook accounts of Stoic ethics that may well go back to Chrysippus. They display an ambivalent relation to Cynicism. Cf. Arius 114.24-25, discussed by Caizzi, above; Cic. Fin . 3.68. Diog. Laert. 121 preserves a more positive attitude, but in isolated form. Panaetius seems to have been more violently anti-Cynic; cf. Cic. Off . 1.128, 148.

[8] This is quite distinct from the later attempts to emend or suppress Zeno's Republic ; this concerns Stoic theory itself, and since it was about the ideal state, it has no direct implications for how the Stoic will behave in actual society. Chrysippus, whose image and behavior were quite different from Zeno's, wrote a Republic which seems to have been just as extreme as Zeno's as to what the ideal Stoic society would be like.

[9] The political interpretation is argued by Andrew Erskine in The Hellenistic Stoa (London, 1990).

used it to finance shipping loans.^[10] Now even if we can't trust this just as it stands (and it contrasts with the stories of shipwreck before Zeno came to Athens), the fact that it is in Diogenes Laertius' biography shows at least that in the ancient tradition it was accepted that Zeno was not really poor. Further, as Decleva Caizzi points out, Antigonus of Carystus reports evidence that he was wealthy enough to contribute toward public works.^[11] In this he contrasts with Cleanthes, who was most unusual in that he really had to earn his living.^[12] But Zeno had a private income, like most ancient philosophers; and so conspicuous poverty on his part shows a deliberate attempt to reject the advantages given him by fortune, like Crates the Cynic, who gave away great riches.^[13]

What Stoic grounds would Zeno have for doing this? Nature, in Stoic ethics, motivates us to seek what is natural for us, and this includes all the preferred indifferents, which Aristotle called external goods—health, fitness, and so on. Wealth is always regarded as one of these, and indeed how could it not be? Wealth is, as Rawls puts it, a primary good; whatever else you may want, it increases your resources for doing that. How could it be rational to disable yourself from achieving your ends? And so we find that in standard Stoic theory wealth is a preferred indifferent, and the Stoics even discuss at great length what are the best ways of making money and claim that the Stoic is the only true money maker (as well as the only true king, etc.).^[14] Decleva Caizzi suggests that Zeno modified this idea to some degree, quoting a passage from Athenaeus to the effect that Zeno made an exception for the legitimate and honorable use of money but in other respects classified it as an indifferent and discouraged pursuit and avoidance of it, saying that one should use plain and simple things in a preferable way.^[15] We should note that this passage is not a very good witness, since its author seems not to understand Stoic theory. For Zeno money could not be anything other than indifferent. But an honorable use of money is not an exception to this, nor is it reasonable to discourage pursuit and avoidance of an indifferent. That something is an indifferent in no way implies that one should minimize one's concern with it. It implies only that its value is different in kind from the value of virtue, and the latter always overrides it. That one's money is indifferent implies neither that one should increase it nor that one should renounce it; it implies only that its use should be unquestionably constrained by virtue.

[10] Diog. Laert. 7.13.

[11] Diog. Laert. 7.12; see Caizzi, above.

[12] Zeno took some of his wages (Diog. Laert. 7.169), making him even poorer.

[13] Diog. Laert. 4.87.

[15] Athenaeus 6.233b-c; SVF 1.239. See Caizzi, above.

Still, the Athenaeus passage, despite confusion, does suggest that Zeno was thought more negative toward wealth than most. Is this attitude consistent with Stoic ethical theory? He could certainly have made it consistent by appealing to the idea of "circumstances."^[16] It is reasonable to follow our natural motivation to protect our own resources—except in certain circumstances; perhaps Zeno thought that his circumstances were special, so that poverty rather than comfort was appropriate for him. And he may well have thought this if he cast himself as a Socrates, especially a Socrates in the Cynic mode (we should remember that the leaders of the skeptical Academy consciously cast themselves as Socratic teachers without affecting poverty). For Zeno what was crucial was to get the message across to people, and this he could not effectively do unless he stood out in the people's minds as a teacher dedicated to his message more than to his own concerns. Zeno's image would then be appropriate from a "practical-pedagogical point of view," as Decleva Caizzi says. But this is achieved at a certain cost. For Zeno's striking image is not that of the life appropriate for the average Stoic. Becoming a Stoic requires you to use your wealth virtuously; to think that it requires you to renounce it is just a mistake. But then becoming a Stoic does not require you to become at all like Zeno. Zeno's image is immediately comprehensible as that of the unworldly, Socratic teacher; but even if it is appropriate to what he sees as his mission, it is importantly in conflict with his message. It is not surprising that none of his successors imitated his didactic use of poverty. Cleanthes simply was poor, a very different thing; and from Chrysippus onward the heads of the school followed their own theory and treated wealth as just another indifferent requiring no special attitude. Later Stoics could treat Zeno as special, his position as founder of the school excusing his "missionary" fervor. But if they were troubled by it they were right, for it is a cardinal point in ancient ethics that your life should match your theories, and Zeno's life makes him an exception to his own theory, and his image does not present the kind of life that a convert to Stoicism would lead.^[17]

Epicurus, by contrast, does not appear as a striking figure at all, and his limited lifestyle is, as Decleva Caizzi claims, not an adoption of pov-

[16] Ariston's theory depends heavily on the use of this idea, so it is reasonable to assume that it was available to Zeno.

[17] In all this I have been following Caizzi's assumption that what we find in the ancient biographies, especially the one by Diogenes Laertius, represents settled fact, if not about Zeno at least about his image in the Stoic school. It is possible, of course, that what we have is only one of several versions; certainly Diogenes seems to be following a particularly "Cynicizing" version (see Jaap Mansfeld, "Diogenes Laertius on Stoic Philosophy," in Diogene Laerzio: Storico del pensiero antico , Elenchos 7 [Naples, 1986], 295-382). But the fact that there was such a version at all shows that Cynic influences on the beginning of the Stoa were thought to be important.

erty but a strategy for ensuring the right kind of (static) pleasure. One reason for this not mentioned in the paper: Epicurus stressed the value of community and cooperation as opposed to ambition and emulation. In the first generation of Epicureans, at least, there seems to have been an attempt to present Epicureanism as a joint effort. Even the doctrines sometimes float in their attribution between Epicurus and other leaders of the school, such as Hermarchus and Metrodorus. This side of the school has been well discussed by Diskin Clay.^[18] Later, of course, Epicurus' own image predominated in the school, in the form of capsule doctrines as well as in the form of pictures on rings and cups.^[19] But in his own lifetime there seems to have been some attempt to present him as primus inter pares and the Epicurean way of life as one in which Epicurus' level of achievement was one that others could reach as well; and this may be important in accounting for the lack of an exemplary image with telling detail.

Two more minor points: Epicurus does talk of Epicurean happiness as being equal to that of the gods, but I wonder whether this is distinctively Epicurean. The Stoics also say that the wise person's happiness is not inferior to that of Zeus,^[20] and the idea in both cases is the same: happiness is, when attained, "complete"; that is, it cannot be increased, and does not get better by lasting longer, for it is not the kind of thing that can be quantified at all. There is thus no sense in which human happiness is inferior to that of the gods merely because it is shorter-lasting. This idea is common to both schools (despite its extreme difficulty). I am also not convinced that the "divine" nature of Epicurean happiness is implied by the preponderance of over in Epicurean texts. Apart from the fact that our sources are not extensive enough for us to generalize safely, we have one Hellenistic source, Arius Didymus, who says firmly that it makes no difference which word you use.^[21] Stylistically is the "loftier" word and thus more appropriate for the gods, but there seems to be no difference of meaning or of reference.

I wonder also whether the Stoics are as indifferent to as Decleva Caizzi suggests. Their claim that virtue is for happiness is central and frequent, and its being a "doxographical formula" suggests its importance in Stoic thought rather than the reverse. The thought behind it is a striking one; see Diogenes Laertius 6. 128:

[18] D. Clay, "Individual and Community in the First Generation of the Epicurean School," in S YZHTHS IS : Studi offerti a Marcello Gigante (Naples, 1983), 255-279.

[19] Cic. Fin . 5.3.

[20] Arius 98.19-99.2. It is as choiceworthy, as fine, and as lofty.

[21] Arius 48.6-11. Unfortunately there is a corruption at the end of the sentence, but this does not affect the present point.

"For if," he says, "high-mindedness is self-sufficient () for putting us above everything, and if it is pan of virtue, then virtue too is self-sufficient for happiness, despising even the things that seem annoying."

"He" here is Hecaton, but the thought is ascribed to Zeno and Chrysippus as well.